<p>The reasons behind the slow pace of corruption suppression within democratic systems are not well understood. We suggest that it relates to a societal inequity, precisely an insufficient parliamentary representation of the interests of private-sector workers. Our analysis of data from European Economic Area countries reveals a positive correlation between the proportion of Members of Parliament who have exclusively worked in the public sector and the level of corruption in their respective countries. Further, we find a negative correlation between a country’s level of corruption representing a form of in-group cooperation and the percentage of its population in cooperatives, which serves as an indicator of universal cooperation. Finally, the emergence of breakpoints in the analysis of corruption data motivates us to propose a network model where the economy is an evolving complex system characterized by a tipping point. We argue that, particularly in more corrupt European countries, private-sector workers should be better represented by parliamentarians with private-sector work experience to successfully combat corruption and thus promote equity and good governance.</p>

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Persistent corruption and parliamentary private-sector work experience

  • Boris Podobnik,
  • Klaus F. Zimmermann,
  • Luka Medvidović

摘要

The reasons behind the slow pace of corruption suppression within democratic systems are not well understood. We suggest that it relates to a societal inequity, precisely an insufficient parliamentary representation of the interests of private-sector workers. Our analysis of data from European Economic Area countries reveals a positive correlation between the proportion of Members of Parliament who have exclusively worked in the public sector and the level of corruption in their respective countries. Further, we find a negative correlation between a country’s level of corruption representing a form of in-group cooperation and the percentage of its population in cooperatives, which serves as an indicator of universal cooperation. Finally, the emergence of breakpoints in the analysis of corruption data motivates us to propose a network model where the economy is an evolving complex system characterized by a tipping point. We argue that, particularly in more corrupt European countries, private-sector workers should be better represented by parliamentarians with private-sector work experience to successfully combat corruption and thus promote equity and good governance.