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<p>The paper proposes two different characterizations of core (allocations) states in a club economy comprised of both small and large agents. We adopt the framework of Ellickson et&#xa0;al. (Econometrica 67:1185–1217, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00073">https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00073</a>, 1999) and treat club goods in a parallel fashion to private goods. To begin with, we characterize the core states of the economy in terms of the size of the blocking coalition and thereby provide extensions for Schmeidler (Schmeidler D (Econometrica 40:579, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1913186">https://doi.org/10.2307/1913186</a>, 1972) and Vind (Econometrica 40:585, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1913188">https://doi.org/10.2307/1913188</a>, 1972). Our results provide a first-ever characterization of core states in a mixed economy in terms of the size of the ordinary coalition. Additionally, we extend the result of Jaskold-Gabszewicz (Economet J Econom Soc, <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1913075">https://doi.org/10.2307/1913075</a>, 1975) to show that in any core state, no coalition of small agents envies the net trade of a coalition containing all large agents and vice-versa. Further, we provide a first-ever characterization of the core by showing that in any core state, no coalitions of small agents envy the net trade of the other.</p>

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On fairness and size of coalitions in economies with club goods

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月5日

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  • Anuj Bhowmik,
  • Sandipan Saha,
  • Soumi Tikader

摘要

The paper proposes two different characterizations of core (allocations) states in a club economy comprised of both small and large agents. We adopt the framework of Ellickson et al. (Econometrica 67:1185–1217, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00073, 1999) and treat club goods in a parallel fashion to private goods. To begin with, we characterize the core states of the economy in terms of the size of the blocking coalition and thereby provide extensions for Schmeidler (Schmeidler D (Econometrica 40:579, https://doi.org/10.2307/1913186, 1972) and Vind (Econometrica 40:585, https://doi.org/10.2307/1913188, 1972). Our results provide a first-ever characterization of core states in a mixed economy in terms of the size of the ordinary coalition. Additionally, we extend the result of Jaskold-Gabszewicz (Economet J Econom Soc, https://doi.org/10.2307/1913075, 1975) to show that in any core state, no coalition of small agents envies the net trade of a coalition containing all large agents and vice-versa. Further, we provide a first-ever characterization of the core by showing that in any core state, no coalitions of small agents envy the net trade of the other.