Scholarlink

<p>This paper examines a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous products and one-sided cost uncertainty. We characterize the undominated equilibria which yield the unique equilibrium payoffs. This uniqueness result could be applied to many important market situations. In particular, we apply our results to examine cost-reducing R&amp;D by an entrant firm that enters a monopolistic market. While significant cost-reducing investments can result in a low marginal cost of production, we show that it may be optimal for the entrant to induce some technological uncertainty by restraining its investment level within certain limits as a means to ease any potential intense competition resulting from such investments.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Bertrand competition with one-sided cost uncertainty

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月6日

查看全文
  • Ramakanta Patra,
  • Hitoshi Sadakane

摘要

This paper examines a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous products and one-sided cost uncertainty. We characterize the undominated equilibria which yield the unique equilibrium payoffs. This uniqueness result could be applied to many important market situations. In particular, we apply our results to examine cost-reducing R&D by an entrant firm that enters a monopolistic market. While significant cost-reducing investments can result in a low marginal cost of production, we show that it may be optimal for the entrant to induce some technological uncertainty by restraining its investment level within certain limits as a means to ease any potential intense competition resulting from such investments.