<p>A Sharing value for transferable utility games allocates the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition among the players within the coalition’s support. Such allocation is conducted in accordance with a specific sharing system that defines the Sharing value. In this paper, we extend Sharing values to multi-choice games. Multi-choice games represent a generalization of transferable utility games, wherein players can choose from multiple activity levels. Unlike transferable utility games, there is no straightforward method to interpret the support of a coalition in a multi-choice game. This complicates the process of distributing the Harsanyi dividend of a multi-choice coalition. We explore three possible interpretations of the support of a multi-choice coalition. Based on these interpretations, we derive three families of Sharing values for multi-choice games. To carry out this study, we examine both novel and classical axioms for multi-choice games, thereby providing an axiomatic foundation for each of these families of values.</p>