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<p>In the ultimatum minigame, proposers can offer either half the total prize or a minimal quantity (e.g., 1). Responders can accept or reject. At the subgame perfect equilibrium, proposers offer the minimal quantity and responders accept. We apply the best experienced payoff (BEP) dynamic to the large population version of this game. The BEP dynamic is generated when players try their strategies a certain number of times and choose the strategy that generates the highest average payoff. We establish conditions under which the subgame perfect equilibrium is stable or unstable. If it is unstable, another stable state can arise where a significant fraction of proposers make high offers. </p>

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The best experienced payoff dynamic in the ultimatum minigame

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月24日

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  • Ratul Lahkar,
  • Amarjyoti Mahanta

摘要

In the ultimatum minigame, proposers can offer either half the total prize or a minimal quantity (e.g., 1). Responders can accept or reject. At the subgame perfect equilibrium, proposers offer the minimal quantity and responders accept. We apply the best experienced payoff (BEP) dynamic to the large population version of this game. The BEP dynamic is generated when players try their strategies a certain number of times and choose the strategy that generates the highest average payoff. We establish conditions under which the subgame perfect equilibrium is stable or unstable. If it is unstable, another stable state can arise where a significant fraction of proposers make high offers.