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<p>We consider Bayes–Nash equilibria of large semi-anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff is determined by his type, his action, and the distribution of the realized types and choices of the others). In a model with finite type and action spaces, we provide a characterization of limits of sequences of Bayes-Nash equilibria as the number of players goes to infinity. Based on this, we show that strict pure-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibria exist in all sufficiently large finite-player games for generic distributions of players’ payoff functions and type distributions.</p>

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Large incomplete-information games with independent types

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月25日

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  • Guilherme Carmona,
  • Konrad Podczeck

摘要

We consider Bayes–Nash equilibria of large semi-anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff is determined by his type, his action, and the distribution of the realized types and choices of the others). In a model with finite type and action spaces, we provide a characterization of limits of sequences of Bayes-Nash equilibria as the number of players goes to infinity. Based on this, we show that strict pure-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibria exist in all sufficiently large finite-player games for generic distributions of players’ payoff functions and type distributions.