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<p>This paper investigates the territorial allocation of public infrastructure in Spain under the Francoist dictatorship (1939–1975), focusing on the balance between economic efficiency and political strategy. We develop a theoretical model grounded in the institutional context of Francoist indicative planning and derive a structural equation, estimated using provincial-level data through nonlinear least squares (NLS). Our results reveal a limited commitment to regional redistribution, with economically disadvantaged areas receiving relatively less investment. In contrast, Catalonia and the Basque Country benefited from statistically significant preferential treatment, even after controlling for efficiency factors. These findings suggest a strategy of selective co-optation, through which the regime sought to increase its influence on politically restive but economically dynamic regions, particularly after the liberalization period of the 1960s. The analysis offers new insights into the political economy of authoritarian infrastructure policies and contributes to understanding the historical roots of territorial inequalities in Spain.</p>

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Regional allocation of public infrastructure in Spain during Francoism: political and economic determinants (1940–1975)

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月13日

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  • Adolfo Cristóbal Campoamor

摘要

This paper investigates the territorial allocation of public infrastructure in Spain under the Francoist dictatorship (1939–1975), focusing on the balance between economic efficiency and political strategy. We develop a theoretical model grounded in the institutional context of Francoist indicative planning and derive a structural equation, estimated using provincial-level data through nonlinear least squares (NLS). Our results reveal a limited commitment to regional redistribution, with economically disadvantaged areas receiving relatively less investment. In contrast, Catalonia and the Basque Country benefited from statistically significant preferential treatment, even after controlling for efficiency factors. These findings suggest a strategy of selective co-optation, through which the regime sought to increase its influence on politically restive but economically dynamic regions, particularly after the liberalization period of the 1960s. The analysis offers new insights into the political economy of authoritarian infrastructure policies and contributes to understanding the historical roots of territorial inequalities in Spain.