<p>Over the recent decade, various approaches have been suggested to reflect on the ethics of technologies for human augmentation. Some researchers focused on the impact of these technologies on individuals, delving into aspects such as psychological and bodily identity, responsibility, and autonomy. Others took a social stance, emphasizing the potential effects of widespread augmentation devices on fundamental moral principles like social justice and equity. In this paper, we explore the concept of “ethical affordance” as a tool for addressing ethical issues stemming from technological artefacts. To this end, we examine the recent account presented by Michael Klenk in his work titled “Affordance Account of Value Embedding.” We identify critical issues within Klenk’s perspective, particularly concerning the thesis that artefacts embody values and the associated equivalence between affordances and values. Subsequently, we assess the utility of affordance-based accounts in addressing ethical concerns related to neuroenhancement technologies (NETs). Contrary to this, we argue against their efficacy and introduce the “difference thesis” to support our position. Essentially, the difference thesis posits that next-generation NETs, especially brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), introduce novel features—specifically, bio-embedded miniaturisation and autonomy—that fundamentally distinguish them from “traditional” tools. These features give rise to ethical questions that cannot be adequately addressed by affordance-based accounts. In conclusion, we assert that these technological artefacts necessitate a paradigm shift to effectively tackle the ethical concerns that emerge from their utilization.</p>