<p>This paper demonstrates that with increased philosophical scrutiny regarding the absurdity of life and meaningful living, the development of “Emotionalized AI” falls under ethical considerations. In this context, contemporary philosophical discussions on the meaning of life—as articulated by thinkers like Thomas Nagel, Joshua Seachris, Thaddeus Metz, and Susan Wolf—intersect with recent years’ reviews of AI ethics, particularly those related to meaningful relationships. The main analysis is conducted by explaining a philosophical perspective on meaningful life and revisiting AI ethics reviews based on it while accepting a superficial understanding of “Emotionalized AI” to avoid metaphysical disputes. In this regard, the questions raised about AI ethics, considering the specialized literature in recent years, are first addressed. Similarly, the discussion focuses on a specific type of ethical concern regarding AI development: human relationships. It is then explained how “love” and, more generally, emotional relationships can be an important resource of life’s meaningfulness. Subsequently, an argument is presented showing that the development of emotionalized AI, by limiting our access to “emotional relationships,” poses a threat to life’s meaningfulness and is therefore ethically unjustifiable. To reinforce this view, I also use some near-reality dystopian scenarios for the AI era. Finally, I re-evaluate the conclusion based on a four-step process for assessing the meaningfulness gap created by emotionalized AI. Applying this process also confirms the result.</p>