<p>We present two general compilers that endow a wide range of cryptographic primitives—including public-key encryption, attribute-based encryption, and (quantum) fully homomorphic encryption—with the publicly verifiable deletion property. Our compilers are based solely on minimal cryptographic assumptions: They require only one-way functions, one-way state generators, or, more generally, hard quantum planted problems for <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{NP}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">NP</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, all of which are implied by the existence of one-way functions. By relying on these minimal assumptions, our compilers enable the addition of the publicly verifiable deletion property to the aforementioned primitives without introducing any additional assumptions. In contrast, prior approaches, such as the one by Bartusek, Khurana, and Poremba [<CitationRef CitationID="CR13">13</CitationRef>], rely on stronger assumptions, including injective trapdoor one-way functions or pseudorandom group actions. From a technical standpoint, our work builds upon the compiler for privately verifiable deletion introduced by Bartusek and Khurana [<CitationRef CitationID="CR11">11</CitationRef>] and enhances it to achieve public verifiability. This is accomplished by incorporating one-time digital signatures—either directly or via indirect mechanisms.</p>

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Publicly Verifiable Deletion: General Compilers from Minimal Assumptions

  • James Bartusek,
  • Dakshita Khurana,
  • Fuyuki Kitagawa,
  • Giulio Malavolta,
  • Ryo Nishimaki,
  • Alexander Poremba,
  • Michael Walter,
  • Takashi Yamakawa

摘要

We present two general compilers that endow a wide range of cryptographic primitives—including public-key encryption, attribute-based encryption, and (quantum) fully homomorphic encryption—with the publicly verifiable deletion property. Our compilers are based solely on minimal cryptographic assumptions: They require only one-way functions, one-way state generators, or, more generally, hard quantum planted problems for \(\textsf{NP}\) NP , all of which are implied by the existence of one-way functions. By relying on these minimal assumptions, our compilers enable the addition of the publicly verifiable deletion property to the aforementioned primitives without introducing any additional assumptions. In contrast, prior approaches, such as the one by Bartusek, Khurana, and Poremba [13], rely on stronger assumptions, including injective trapdoor one-way functions or pseudorandom group actions. From a technical standpoint, our work builds upon the compiler for privately verifiable deletion introduced by Bartusek and Khurana [11] and enhances it to achieve public verifiability. This is accomplished by incorporating one-time digital signatures—either directly or via indirect mechanisms.